Horn of Africa HoA European Commission

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COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW CR OF 2016 17 ECHO HORN OF AFRICA HOA DROUGHT RESPONSE. Map of the studied area, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW CR OF 2016 17 ECHO HORN OF AFRICA HOA DROUGHT RESPONSE. Tabl e o f c o n t e n t S,Map of the studied area 2. Executive summary 5,Key findings 6,Conclusions 8,Recommendations 9. FULL REPORT 13,1 INTRODUCTION 14,1 1 Background 14. 1 2 Scope and objectives 14,1 3 Methodology 14,2 DROUGHTS AND FOOD SECURITY.
CRISES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 15,2 1 The regional context 15. 2 2 The context of the food security crisis in the three countries 16. 2 3 International politics and security 18, 3 DROUGHT PATTERNS AND HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES 19. 3 1 A few regional consequences 19,3 2 Ethiopia 19. 3 3 Somalia 20,3 4 Kenya 21,4 BETWEEN DROUGHTS WORKING ON RESILIENCE 21. 4 1 Overall regional approach 21,4 2 Ethiopia 21,4 3 Somalia 23.
4 4 Kenya 25,5 EVOLUTION IN THE DROUGHT RESPONSE 26. 5 1 Changes in early warning 26,5 2 Speed and timeliness of response 35. 5 3 Scale of the response and trends in funding 42. 5 4 Content of response 47, 5 5 Coordination and monitoring and accountability systems 50. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW CR OF 2016 17 ECHO HORN OF AFRICA HOA DROUGHT RESPONSE. Tabl e o f c o n t e n t S,6 IS THE AID SECTOR MAKING PROGRESS 53. 6 1 Improvements 53,6 1 1 Better early warning systems 53.
6 1 2 Faster response 53,6 1 3 Improved response contents 53. 6 1 4 Better coordination 54,6 2 Remaining challenges 54. 6 2 1 Early warning 54,6 2 2 Speed of response 55, 6 2 3 Quality of the situation assessment and analysis 56. 6 2 4 The politicisation of aid 56, 6 2 5 Resilience and the humanitarian development migration security nexus 56. 6 2 6 Livelihood protection 57,6 2 7 Response in the most difficult areas 57.
6 2 8 Coordination with non traditional donors 57,7 ECHO IN THE HORN OF AFRICA THE CHALLENGES. OF BEING A LEARNING DONOR 58, 7 1 The HIP process not in line with crisis dynamics 58. 7 2 Being needs based or being proactive 58,7 3 ECHO s relations with governments 59. 7 4 ECHO DEVCO and LRRD 59,8 RECOMMENDATIONS 60,For all actors 60. For ECHO 62,ANNEXES 65,Annex N 1 Agreed final Terms of Reference 66.
Annex N 2 Mission itineraries people met 74,Annex N 3 Consulted Bibliography 78. MPPRREEHHEENNSSI IVVEE RREEVVI IEEW, W CCRR OOFF 22001166 1177 EECCHHOO HHOORRNN OOFF AAFFRRI ICCAA HHOOAA DDRROOUUGGHHTT RREESSPPOONNSSEE. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW CR OF 2016 17 ECHO HORN OF AFRICA HOA DROUGHT RESPONSE. The Horn of Africa has been affected by a variety of climatic events which have led to. several major droughts in the last 15 years The international aid system has tried to. adjust to these events and improve its capacity to respond The most recent episode. of severe drought took place in 2016 17 This led to a huge international relief effort. and despite very high malnutrition rates enormous loss of livestock assets and a. great deal of displacement mass mortality was avoided across the region and famine. conditions did not ensue, In 2018 the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid. Operations ECHO 1 contracted the INSPIRE consortium to assess how the response. by the international humanitarian community as a whole and ECHO in particular had. changed since the previous droughts in the Horn of Africa HoA in 2011 12 The re. view aimed to analyse the factors that determined the performance of the response. to document improved practices and the challenges in their implementation and to. identify lessons so that improvements can be made to ECHO s operational proce. dures structures and policies,Key findings,Contextual changes and specific crisis dynamics. Although the crises in 2011 12 and 2016 17 were labelled droughts it would be. misleading to think of them simply as the consequences of rain failure The interac. tion between rain shortage mobility political crises and conflicts has been widely. documented Throughout the region the worst indicators were not necessarily in. the areas with the greatest anomalies in rainfall but rather in the areas that had. been affected by conflict or were marginalized and under developed In pastoral or. agro pastoral areas one failed rainy season should only create hardship rather than. famine On the other hand if several consecutive bad seasons are combined with. structural poverty political marginalisation or conflict the population may be unable. to adopt adaptive population movements and coping mechanisms Climate change is. increasingly affecting the area with changing rainfall patterns both in terms of time. and geography and the modification of the vegetation cover As a result periods. between bad years are becoming shorter and recovery is more difficult. Levels of resources allocated, Between 2011 12 and 2016 17 there was no significant difference in the amount mobi.
lised for the global international response for Somalia while the amount was somewhat. higher for Ethiopia For Kenya very little was mobilised in both cases by ECHO while. resources coming from EU funded development programmes were allocated to the. drought response It seems that the main question is not how much money is mobilised. but how it is used, 1 To make the report easier to read the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian. Aid Operations will be referred to simply as ECHO, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW CR OF 2016 17 ECHO HORN OF AFRICA HOA DROUGHT RESPONSE. Understanding weather information better and using it. more efficiently, Although weather forecasting is continually improving and becoming more acces. sible it is still not playing a significant role in determining how resources should be. used Governments who have access to the information are still rarely willing to al. locate resources on the basis of forecasts when they have so many other pressing. demands for resources Unfortunately the general unwillingness to act on the basis. of forecasts is extended to a certain degree to preparedness measures The implica. tions of the unwillingness to allocate resources until indicators of suffering e g GAM. are rising are well recognised given the time taken to translate funding decisions to. assistance on the ground response will always be late. timeliness of the response, There was a significant improvement in terms of alertness and geographic coverage. between 2011 and 2016 17 with some variation between the three countries The. quicker triggering of the response in Somalia in 2016 and even more in 2017 was. possible due to robust early warning information which was provided more quickly. through different formal and informal channels the presence of more actors in the. field and the engagement of key donors who were determined to avoid a repetition. of the 2011 famine In Kenya and Ethiopia the improvement in timeliness was more. limited as most of the early warning systems and response mechanisms are govern. ment led systems which too often react slowly The humanitarian response was de. layed by the same factors in 2015 and in 2016 as it had been in 2011 12 namely. limited willingness to respond to meteorological forecasts even for heightened pre. paredness an insistence on waiting for official early warning despite the well known. inability of these systems to be timely see above an unwillingness to respond based. on an analysis of the inevitable trajectory of livelihoods and humanitarian indicators. waiting instead until such indicators especially child malnutrition were already cri. tical an unwillingness to divert development resources to scale up support where. critically needed for livelihoods water etc in the absence of a Government reco. gnised emergency slow bureaucratic processes exacerbated by the centralisation of. decision making and lack of preparedness by operational agencies leading to long. delays between the decision to act and actually reaching people in need. Why changes took place factors influencing,timeliness and speed.
International political situations The wars in Syria Yemen and South Sudan com. peted with the Horn of Africa for attention and resources. Aid and local politics To talk of famine is also highly sensitive politically The fact that. droughts happened in politically sensitive years with electoral processes in Kenya and. Ethiopia affected the willingness to declare and call for international assistance. Changes in local governance In Somalia the main structural factors responsible. for changes between the response in 2011 and the response in 2016 17 relate to. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW CR OF 2016 17 ECHO HORN OF AFRICA HOA DROUGHT RESPONSE. governance namely an improved security situation In Kenya the state actively took. on the central coordination role and the decentralised governments got more in. volved in coordination at the local level although sometimes in a rather confused. manner as coordination capacities and experience are still relatively underdeveloped. at the county level In Ethiopia the response mechanisms were practically identical. between the 2011 and 2016 17 crises, Field presence The pre crisis presence on the ground of agencies who were either. direct partners or broadly allied to the humanitarian cause proved crucial Such agen. cies are critical in terms of having information on developing crises and without their. active presence before a crisis an emergency response can be delayed by a month. and will inevitably have a much poorer understanding of the context for many more. months As happened during previous droughts there were two delays of several. months the first in terms of making the decision that the situation needed emer. gency aid and the second to get assistance to the affected people This shows that. lessons on preparedness were not sufficiently taken on board. Safety nets Although social safety nets including the Productive Safety Net Pro. gramme PSNP in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net Programme HSNP in Kenya. were already functioning in 2011 12 they played a much greater role in 2016 17 With. a level of resources that dwarfs that of emergency relief they were injecting resources. into drought affected populations even as the crises developed i e many months be. fore relief aid arrived The 2016 17 crises showed that there are still a number of fac. tors that require attention before fully engaging in such an approach see chapter 4. Conclusions, Over the years the humanitarian system has evolved and has tried hard to improve its. capacity to respond better faster and in a more coordinated and inclusive way Signi. ficant progress was observed between the responses to two consecutive crises in the. Horn of Africa with a complex set of causes ranging from climatic events to conflict. and economic marginalisation better use of cash transfer programmes more atten. tion to early warning signals and stronger engagement with local institutions ECHO. has played an important role in promoting and supporting these changes However. despite this progress the system has not been able to achieve a much higher level of. effectiveness Indeed this is still being compromised by internal bureaucracy political. choices and risk aversion see 6 2 7,Recommendations. Some of these recommendations have previously appeared in several evaluations. and research studies concerning not only the Horn of Africa but also other crisis. areas Their regular occurrence means that they are related to systemic problems. that need concerted efforts to be properly addressed some within the aid system. as a whole some within the humanitarian sector as a whole and others within ECHO. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW CR OF 2016 17 ECHO HORN OF AFRICA HOA DROUGHT RESPONSE. For all actors, Recommendation N 1 Humanitarian agencies individually and collectively. need to reflect why over the past decades so many of the same recommen. dations have been repeated in relation to the need for faster timelier response. and yet those same recommendations are being repeated here yet again In addi. tion development actors need to carefully consider what sectors to invest in and how. to support preparedness e g water health care education etc particularly when. crises are already threatening, Recommendation N 2 Humanitarian partners NGOs UN agencies also.
need to improve their speed of reaction and their adaptability to change Aid. actors should ensure that when money is available they manage to deploy in areas. in need and adjust their methods to the pastoralist nomadic context which is very. different from the agricultural context, Recommendation N 3 Systematically recording and analysing delays in aid. responses will make it possible to make rapid corrections in a given opera. tion and should allow collective learning and more structural changes for. future emergencies The humanitarian system has found it difficult to put into prac. tice repeated evaluation recommendations about slow response The Inter Agency. Standing Committee IASC could develop guidelines for monitoring the speed of each. step in an emergency response It could also develop guidelines to ensure that eva. luations systematically analyse the timeliness of responses and the causes of delays. and calculate the additional suffering and loss that the latter bring In Ethiopia spe. cifically there is a need to rethink how the Early Warning System should<. peted with the Horn of Africa for attention and resources Aid and local politics To talk of famine is also highly sensitive politically The fact that droughts happened in politically sensitive years with electoral processes in Kenya and

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